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THE PRESERVATION OF PENN
CENTRAL
The Spring Team of the Supreme
Court marked a victory for preservation
law proponents, when the Court validated
New York City's refusal to allow a fifty-
five story addition to Grand Central
Station. Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. _ (opinion
No. 77-444, June 26, 1978) (hereinafter,
Penn Central). The purpose here is to
delineate as a model for municipalities
and local governments the provisions found
in the first major preservation law to be
ratified by the Supreme Court. The New
York City Preservation Law of 1963 (here-
inafter, the Act), is perhaps most impor-
tant to preservationists upon the realiza-
tion that the Act can be administered with-
out a threat of fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment challenges. New York City, N.Y.,
CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A,
§ 205-1.0 et seg. (1976) (hereinafter,
Codel ___).
Grand Central Station is owned by
Penn Central Transportation Co. (Penn
Central). In an effort to increase reve-
nue, Penn Central negotiated a fifty-year
renewable lease to Union General Properties
(UGP), a United Kingdom Corporation. UGP
was to pay Penn Central one million dollars
annually during the construction of a
fifty-five story office building over the
existing Terminal structure. Upon com-
pletion, UGP would pay Penn Central three
million dollars a year for the remainder
of the term. Since the city had designated
Grand Central Station as a designated land-
mark, two plans were submitted to the Land-
marks Preservation Commission pursuant to
the Act. The plans essentially called for
retaining the station intact (with some
facial alterations), while building the
tower above the existing structure. The
Historic Landmark Commission rejected both
proposals. The rejection came in spite of
the fact that the Station's original plans
called for a twenty-story tower; the ter-
minal itself was designed and constructed
with base pillars to accommodate such a
structure. Subsequent to the Commission
ruling, Penn Central brought suit to enjoin
the enforcement of the landmark law and
claimed that the restrictions amounted to
unconstitutional taking without just com-
pensation.
The trial term of the New York
Supreme Court gave Penn Central an injunc-
tion and declaratory relief holding that
the city had "taken" property without
"Just compensation" and "arbitrarily"
deprived Penn Central of property without
due process in violation of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
The Appeal Term of the New York
Supreme Court reversed and found the Land-
mark Preservation Law essential to the
promotion of a legitimate public purpose
in the protection of landmarks. The Appeal
Court held that Penn Central must show that
the restrictions deprived it of all reason-
able and beneficial use of the property.
The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the Appeal Term and stated that
no "taking" had occurred since control of
the property had not been transferred to
the city. Further, the Court of Appeals
found that regulation of exploitationary
uses is not unconstitutional. Finally,
the Court of Appeals pointed to Penn
Central's failure to show substantial harm,
especially in light of the alternative
benefits allowed to Penn Central under the
Landmark Preservation Law. The United
States Supreme Court, on review of the New
York Court of Appeals decision, affirmed
with a majority opinion written by Justice
Brennan.
The Supreme Court noted two issues:
whether restrictions placed on the use and
development of the property under the New
York City Landmark Preservation Law con-
stituted a taking for public use within
the fifth amendment (which requires "Just
compensation" and applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess requirements); and if the Commisgion's
restrictions did constitute taking, then,
do transferable development rights amount
to just compensation. Since the Court
decided that there was no taking, the
second issue was not considered.
On the basis of an historical anal-
ysis of the taking issue, Justice Brennan
found no set formula for deciding when a
taking occurs. Rather, Brennan notes a
case-by-case application. However, sev-
eral factors for inquiry are discerned: the
economic impact; the extent to which regu-
lation interferes with investment consider-
ations; and whether the interference is a
physical invasion bya governmental unit-
each must be examined. However, Brennan
concludes that when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good, the Court has
held that the government can enforce laws
which would adversely affect recognized
economic interests.
Brennan compares zoning cases where
state tribunals reasonably concluded that
health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the public is promoted by prohibiting
certain uses of land to rationalize the
validation of landmark preservation laws
in general. Admitting that landmark laws
apply only to selected parcels, Brennan
claims that landmark legislation is not
spot zoning--which is an arbitrary selec-
tion of particular tracts for a use incon-
sistent with surrdunding uses. Brennan
points out that in the case of preservation
laws, legitimate historical and aesthetic
interests are protected.
Accepting that landmark preserva-
tion laws are legitimate, the Court exam-
ines the taking question. Penn Central
claims that the restrictions deprive it of
a valuable property right--that the super-
adjacent airspace above Grand Central
Station has been taken. Further, Penn
Central argues that the restrictions dimin-
ish the property value of the terminal and
that the hardship incurred is selectively
and arbitrarily applied to a few property
owners. Finally, Penn Central claims that
each structure in the area is not subject
to the same restrictions.
In approaching Penn Central's argu-
ments, the court inquires whether the
interference of the restrictions is of such
magnitude that eminent domain proceedings
should be instituted and just compensation
awarded. The inquiry is limited to the
severity of impact on Penn Central. The
court found that the present use of Grand
Central Station had not been impaired;
that a reasonable return has not been pre-
cluded; that the restrictions have not pro-
hibited all construction in the airspace
above the Terminal. In conclusion, Brennan
notes that a substantial relationship
between the restrictions and promotion of
the general welfare exists to validate
preservation laws. Further, not only was
there no taking, but the Court found that
the New York Landmark legislation permitted
Penn Central opportunities to enhance the
Terminal and other properties, besides per-
mitting reasonable beneficial use of the
landmark site. See Penn Central, Opinion
No. 77-444 (June 26, 1978) at 31.
What is important is the law which
was upheld. The New York City Landmark
Preservation Law of 1965 is authorized
under a valid state enabling act. N.Y.
GENERAL UNICIPAL LW i 96-a (McKinney,
1977). The statute declares it is the
public policy of the state of New York to
preserve historical structures and author-
ize local governments to impose reasonable
restrictions to do so.
In order to comply with the state
preservation objectives, the city passed
the 1965 Landmark Preservation Law based
on the rationale that the standing of New
York City as a world-wide tourist center
would be in jeopardy if landmarks were not
afforded protection. Code § 205-1.0(a).
The Administrative Code lists the benefits
which the city hoped would accrue under
the Act: fostering civic pride in past
accomplishments, protecting the tourist
trade; support and stimulation of business
and industry; strengthening the economy
of the city; and promoting the use of
public landmarks for general welfare.
Code S 205-1.0(b).
The Act operates to achieve its
goals under a method of involving local
.government in the land-use decisions
affecting these properties and provides
"services, standards, and incentives" such
as will encourage preservation by private
owners and users. Penn Central, opinion
at 3. In addition, the Act places restric-
tions on landmark properties to protect
the major objectives. Finally, the intent
of the Act is to promote a reasonable
return to owners on investments and uses
consistent with preservation goals.
Primary responsibility for admin-
istering the Act lies with the Landmarks
Preservation Commission, an eleven-member
agency which is assisted by a technical
staff. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADM. CODE §
534 (1976). The Commission is composed
of three architects, one historian quali-
fied in preservation areas, one city planner
or landscape architect, one realtor, and
at least one resident of each of the city's
five boroughs. Id. The function of the
Commission is to identify properties having
a "special historical or aesthetic interest
or value as part of the development, heri-
tage, or cultural characteristics of the
city, state or nation." Code § 205-1.0(n)
and see § 205-1.0(h).
If the Commission determines that
a building or area meets the criteria of
the ordinance; and after all interested
parties are rendered the opportunity to
comment and to be heard, it can designate
the building as a "landmark." Code 1 205-
1.0(h). The ordinance defines landmark
as: "Any improvement, any part of which
is thirty years or older, which has a spe-
cial character or special historical or
aesthetic interest or value as part of the
development, heritage or cultural charac-
teristics of the city, state or nation and
which has been designated as a landmark
pursuant to the provisions of this chap-
ter." Code I 207-1.0(n). The Commission
may designate as a "landmark site" the
particular land on which the landmark is
located. A "landmark site" is: "An improve-
ment parcel or part thereof on which is
situated a landmark and any abutting
improvement parcel or part thereof used as
and constituting part of the premises on
which the landmark is situated, and which
has been designated as a landmark site
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."
Code § 207-1.0(o). In addition, the Com-
mission can designate a historic district
as: "1--any area which contains improve-
ments which: (a) have a special character
or special historical or aesthetic inter-
est or value; and (b) represents one or
more architectural styles or periods typi-
cal of one or more eras in the history of
the city; and (c) causes such area by rea-
son of such factors to constitute a dis-
tinct section of the city; and 2-has been
designated asa historic district pursuant
to the provisions of this Chapter." Code
§ 207-1.0(h). Finally, the Commission may
define scenic landmarks and interior land-
marks. Code § 207-1.0(w), § 207-1.0(m).
Once the Commission makes adesig-
nation, the New York City Board of Estimates
considers such factors as the relationship
of the designated property to the master
plan; the zoning resolution; projected
public improvements; and any plans for the
renewal of the area involved. Code § 207-
2.0(g)(i). At the conclusion of its
inquiry, the Board of Estimates makes a
Final Designation, which may modify or
disapprove the Commission's designation.
At this point, the first safeguard device
in the ordinance engages: the property
owner may seek judicial review of the final
designation. Note that Penn Central did
not exercise its right to seek judicial
review of the designation.
The effect of the final designation
is to place restrictions on the property
owner's options with regard to the uses of
the landmark site. First, the Act imposes
an affirmative duty upon the property
owner to keep the exterior features of the
structure in good repair to assure that
the site is protectedand preserved. Code
I 207-10.0(a). Second, prior approval by
the Commission is necessary for any pro-
posals to change exterior architectural
features or.to construct exterior improve-
ments on the site. In this manner, all
alterations receive due consideration of
both the public interest and the landowner's
interests in possession and use. Code§
207-4.0 to 207-9.0.
The ordinance provides procedures
to obtain administrative approval for
altering a landmark site. The landowner
might apply fora certificate of no effect
on protected architectural features. The
Commission, in turn, evaluates the appli-
cation as to whether any change or affects
on architectural features would occur to
upset the harmony of the landmark, as well
as the ordinance. Code § 207-5.0. Denial
of the certificate actuates the second
safeguard allowing the landowner the option
of judicial review. Penn Central did not
exercise this option either.
The landowner may seek a certifi-
cate for appropriateness. By focusing on
historical, aesthetic, and architectural
values, the Commission may grant an appli-
cation for appropriateness if proposed
construction on the landmark site would
not unduly hinder the protection, enhance-
ment, perpetration, and use of the land-
mark. Code § 207-6.0. The third safeguard
provides judicial reviewon denial and the
Commission's determinations of appropri-
ateness or no effect. The landowners may
also submit an alternative or modified plan
for approval. Id. Penn Central, on denial
of its plans, did not submit alternative
plans or offer to modify. Moreover, the
Court did not find that no construction
could occur at the Terminal.
The landowner may also apply for
a certificate of appropriateness on the
ground ofinsufficient return. Code § 207-
8.0. Special mechanisms are employed
dependent upon whether or not the landmark
has tax exemptions. Code § 207-8.0(c).
The Commission must inquire as to whether
the landmark designation causes economic
hardship. If the parcel is not tax-exempt
and the certificates are denied, yet the
owner shows that he, or she, is not earn-
ing a reasonable return on the property-
in its present state-the Commission and
other city agencies assume the task of
developing a plan which would assure the
owner a reasonable return. The plan may
include tax exemptions (partial or com-
plete); remission of taxes; alteration
authorizations; and construction and recon-
struction appropriate for and not incon-
sistent with the purposesof the Act. Id.
The private owner may accept or reject the
plan. However, if he accepts, he must
proceed to carryout the plan by its terms.
Should the owner reject the plan, then,
the Commission will initiate the city's
efforts in eminent domain proceedings to
acquire protective interests in the land-
mark. The city must take such measures
within a specified time period, otherwise
the Commission must issue a notice allow-
ing the owner to alter or to improve the
landmark as proposed in the application
fora certificate of appropriateness. Id.
Tax exempt structures are eligible
for special treatment if four conditions
are met. Id. The owner must have pre-
viously entered into an agreement to sell
contingent upon receiving a certificate of
appropriateness.- Second, the property must
be incapable of earning a reasonable return.
Third, the structure is no longer suitable
for its past or present uses or purposes.
Finally, the buyer intends to alter the
landmark. Assuming that the landowner
were to show the unlikelihood of a reason-
able return, the Commission must find
another buyer or allow the sale and sub-
sequent construction to proceed. Addi-
tional approaches for the landowner are
judicial relief and the special instance
where it is possible to show that the land-
mark as restricted, is totally inadequate
for the legitimate needs of the owner. If
such a burden is met, a New York court has
held restrictions invalid as applied to
the parcel. Lutheran Church v. City of
New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121 (1974).
Certainly from an economic perspec-
tive, the most important sections of the Act
deal with the private owners enhanced spe-
cial position. Upon gaining a landmark
designation, the Court noted that the
Transfer Development Rights provide the
owner with special grants of privilege to
develop property to the fullest extent.
The Development rights are transferable to
contiguous property on the same city block.
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION
Art. I. ch. 2 § 12-10 (1978). The advan-
tage is to allow development of the private
owner's adjacent lands such that he (and
indirectly, the public) can benefit from
the landmark he possesses. Recent ordi-
nances increased the development right
function-properties across the street
became eligible. See Penn Central, foot-
note 8 at 4, and NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ZON-
ING RESOLUTION, Art. I. ch. 2 § 74-79 to
74-793.
In obtaining approval for a trans-
fer, the Commission must be presented with
plans for the development of the transferee
lot to determirm whether construction would
be compatible with the landmark. Once the
Commissionhas approved the transfer, then
the New York City Planning Commission will
review the proposed transfer to determine
effects on occupants of buildings in the
vicinity and whether the landowner will
preserve the landmark. Finally, the Board
of Estimates has authority to grant or
deny the transfer.
The New York City Landmarks Pre-
servation Law of 1965 is not presented as
an ideal model to preservationists and
municipalities interested in maintaining
ties with the past. Rather, it is offered
here as a model which has been ratified,
and accepted by the Supreme Court as a via-
ble approach to preservation of national,
state and local landmarks. However, it
might do well to comment on several weak-
nesses and criticisms of the Act, and con-
sequently, the Penn Central decision.
First, in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
pointed to the severe impact of the restric-
tions in this particular case--literally,
a loss of a multimillion dollar revenue
opportunity. Yurther, Rhenquist accepts
Penn Central's contention that the private
owner should not be made to bear the brunt
of preservation, rather, it is a cost which
should be spread to the public in the form
of taxes. The disparity of the actual
loss to the private owner relative to the
gains of "enhanced value" is discussed in
other quarters. Costonis, 85 HARV. L. REV.
574 (1972). Costonis advocates a"Chicago
Plan" which employs an incentive package
to provide owners with recovery of actual
losses. While the court makes a strong
effort to analyze the current strains of
the "taking" issue, highlighting the prob-
lem of effective urban and rural land use
in today's world may be the real value of
Penn Central and New York City's efforts
to preserve its historical traditions.
